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Abstract
We propose a new model of volatility where financial leverage amplifies equity
volatility by what we call the “leverage multiplier.” The exact specification is moti-
vated by standard structural models of credit; however, our parameterization departs
from the classic Merton (1974) model and can accommodate environments where the
firm’s asset volatility is stochastic, asset returns can jump, and asset shocks are non-
normal. In addition, our specification nests both a standard GARCH and the Merton
model, which allows for a statistical test of how leverage interacts with equity volatil-
ity. Empirically, the Structural GARCH model outperforms a standard asymmetric
GARCH model for approximately 74 percent of the financial firms we analyze. We
then apply the Structural GARCH model to two empirical applications: the leverage
eﬀect and systemic risk measurement. As a part of our systemic risk analysis, we de-
fine a new measure called “precautionary capital” that uses our model to quantify the
advantages of regulation aimed at reducing financial firm leverage.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis revealed the damaging role of financial market leverage on the real econ-
omy. Nonetheless, it is far from clear that reducing this leverage will stabilize the real
economy, let alone stabilize the financial sector. The extreme volatility of asset prices was a
joint consequence of the high impact of economic news and high leverage. A critical question
that remains is how much reduction in equity volatility could be expected from reductions
in leverage.
To answer this question, this paper develops a model of equity volatility that reflects firm
leverage. The model is motivated by the structural models of credit that follow from Merton
(1974).1 However our model extends beyond the classic Merton model to accommodate
jumps and stochastic volatility. In our model, asset volatility is stochastic and fat tailed.
It is amplified by a “leverage multiplier” to yield equity market volatility. The parameters
of the model are estimated by maximum likelihood and can be used to decompose equity
volatility into the part due to asset volatility and the part due to leverage. The promise
of structural credit models for volatility modeling is related to the Schaefer and Strebulaev
(2008) observation that hedge ratios are well modeled by structural models of credit risk.
As with all structural models, we begin from the observation that equity is ultimately a
call option on the asset value of the firm, but that the appropriate option pricing formula
is dependent on the structure of the unobservable asset value. We then examine a range of
economic models that diﬀer in how asset values evolve, leading us to specify an empirical
model that approximately nests the candidate option formulae. The econometric model
entails parameterizing the leverage multiplier as a function of the moneyness of the option
1A non-exhaustive list of theoretical extensions of the Merton (1974) model includes Black and Cox
(1976), Leland and Toft (1996), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), and McQuade (2013).
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and the volatility over the life of the debt, without requiring the unobservable asset value.
We call this specification a Structural GARCH model given its theoretical underpinnings.
Our empirical results show that incorporating leverage via the leverage multiplier, as in
our Structural GARCH model, outperforms a simple vanilla asymmetric GARCH model of
equity returns.2 An additional advantage of our model is that it nests a vanilla GARCH,
and thus provides a natural way to assess the statistical significance of leverage for equity
volatility.3 For the sample of firms we examine, nearly 74 percent favor our Structural
GARCH model over a plain asymmetric GARCH model. Since the Structural GARCH
model delivers a daily series for asset volatility, we are also able to study the joint dynamics
of asset volatility and leverage in the build up to the financial crisis. The empirical results
reveal that at the onset of the financial crisis, the rise in equity volatility was primarily due
to rising leverage, but later phases also include substantial rises in asset volatility.
To further demonstrate the usefulness of our econometric model, we apply the Structural
GARCH model to two applications: determining the sources of asymmetric equity volatility
and measuring systemic risk. Equity volatility asymmetry refers to the well-known negative
correlation between equity returns and equity volatility. One popular explanation for this
empirical regularity is leverage. Namely, when a firm experiences negative equity returns,
its leverage mechanically rises, and thus the firm has more risk (volatility). Some examples
of previous work on this topic include Black (1976), Christie (1982), French, Schwert, and
Stambaugh (1987), and Bekaert and Wu (2000). The challenge faced in previous studies is
that asset returns are unobservable, so teasing out the causes of volatility asymmetry requires
2There is a vast literature on ARCH/GARCH models, starting with Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986).
3Indeed, asymmetric GARCH models have been interpreted as capturing the interaction between leverage
and equity volatility. This is famously known as the “leverage eﬀect” of Black (1976) and Christie (1982). In
contrast, our model directly incorporates volatility asymmetry at the asset level and also directly incorporates
leverage into equity volatility. As we will discuss shortly, this also allows us to tease out the root of the
observed leverage eﬀect.
3
alternative strategies. For instance, Choi and Richardson (2012) approach this problem by
invoking the second Modigliani–Miller theorem. In turn, they directly compute the market
value of assets at a monthly frequency by first constructing a return series for the market
value of bonds (and loans). Still, determining the true market value of the bonds of a given
firm is diﬃcult in lieu of liquidity issues, especially at the daily frequency with which our
model operates.
On the other hand, the Structural GARCHmodel provides a simpler way to estimate asset
returns and volatility, while crucially allowing for the debt of each firm to be risky. Given
that we obtain asymmetric GARCH parameter estimates for daily asset returns, our model
provides a novel way to explore the root of the leverage eﬀect.4 We find that, on average,
firms with more leverage exhibit a bigger gap between the asymmetry of their equity return
volatility and their asset return volatility. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that the overall
contribution of measured leverage to the so-called “leverage eﬀect” is somewhat weak; for our
sample of firms, leverage accounts for only about 17 percent of equity volatility asymmetry.5
The second application of our Structural GARCH model involves systemic risk measure-
ment. We extend the SRISK measure of Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson
(2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) by incorporating the Structural GARCH model for
firm-level equity returns. The SRISK measure captures how much capital a firm would
need in the event of another financial crisis, where a financial crisis is defined as a 40 percent
4Also, in contrast to previous work, our model directly incorporates risky debt into the equity return
specification. The emphasis of risky debt is important, since it introduces important nonlinear interactions
between leverage and equity volatility.
5These results are consistent with Bekaert and Wu (2000) and Hasanhodzic and Lo (2013) who find
that leverage does not appear to fully explain the asymmetry in equity volatility. Bekaert and Wu (2000),
however, assume that debt is riskless and are therefore silent about the nonlinear interaction between equity
volatility and leverage. Hasanhodzic and Lo (2013) focus on a subset of firms with no leverage, which
we do not pursue in this paper. The results in Choi and Richardson (2012) are also consistent with our
cross-sectional results, but they find evidence of a larger contribution of leverage to the leverage eﬀect.
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decline in the aggregate stock market over a six month period. Importantly, the leverage am-
plification mechanism built into our model naturally embeds the types of volatility-leverage
spirals observed during the crisis. It is precisely this feature that makes leverage an impor-
tant consideration even in times of low volatility, since a negative sequence of equity returns
increases leverage and further amplifies negative shocks to assets. Accordingly, we show that
using the Structural GARCH model for systemic risk measurement shows promise in provid-
ing earlier signals of financial firm distress. Compared with models that do not incorporate
leverage amplifications explicitly, the model-implied expected capital shortfall in a crisis for
firms, such as Citibank and Bank of America, rises much earlier prior to the financial crisis
(and remains as high or higher through the crisis). Thus, Structural GARCH serves as an
important step towards developing countercyclical measures of systemic risk that may also
motivate policies which prevent excess leverage from building within the financial system.
To this end, we then propose a new measure of systemic risk which we call precautionary
capital. Precautionary capital is the answer to the question: how much equity do we have
to add to a firm today in order to ensure some arbitrary level of confidence that the firm
will not go bankrupt in a future crisis? In the Structural GARCH model, we then show that
preventative measures that reduce leverage can be very powerful since holding more capital
results in lower volatility, lower beta, and lower probability of failure. This is a sensible
outcome that is not implied by conventional volatility models.
Section 2 introduces the Structural GARCHmodel and its economic underpinnings. Here,
we will use basic ideas from structural models of credit to explore the relationship between
leverage and equity volatility, which leads to a natural econometric specification for equity
and asset returns. In Section 3, we describe the data used in our empirical work, along with
some technical issues regarding estimation of the model. Section 4 describes our empirical
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results and explores some aggregate implications of our model. In sections 5 and 6, we
apply the Structural GARCH model to two applications: asymmetric volatility in equity
returns and systemic risk measurement. Finally, Section 7 concludes with suggestions of
more applications of the Structural GARCH model.
2. Structural GARCH
Our goal is to explore the relationship between the leverage of a firm and its equity volatility.
A simple framework to explore this relationship is the classical Merton (1974) model of credit
risk and extensions of this seminal work. Equity holders are entitled to the assets of the firm
that exceed the outstanding debt. As Merton observed, equity can then be viewed as a
call option on the total assets of a firm with the strike of the option being the debt level
of the firm. In this model, the fact that firms have outstanding debt of varying maturities
is ignored, and we will also adopt this assumption for the sake of maintaining a simple
econometric model. The purpose of using structural models is to provide economic intuition
for how leverage and equity volatility should interact. It is worth emphasizing that we call
our volatility model a “Structural GARCH” because it is motivated from this analysis, not
because it derives precisely from a particular option pricing model. In fact, one advantage of
our approach is our ability to remain relatively neutral about the true option pricing model
that underlies the data generating process.
2.1. Motivating the Econometric Model
As is standard in structural models of credit, the equity value of a firm is a function of the
asset process and the debt level of the firm. We can therefore define the equity value as
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follows:
Et = f (At, Dt,  A,t, ⌧, rt) (1)
where f(·) is an unspecified call option function, At is the current market value of assets, Dt
is the current book value of outstanding debt,  A,t is the (potentially stochastic) volatility
of the assets. ⌧ is the life of the debt, and finally, rt is the annualized risk-free rate at time
t.6 Next, we specify the following generic process for assets and variance:
dAt
At
= µA(t)dt+  A,tdBA(t)
d 2A,t = µv(t,  A,t)dt+  v(t,  A,t)dBv(t) (2)
where dBA(t) is a standard Brownian motion.  A,t captures potential time-varying asset
volatility, which we will model formally in Section 2.4.7 The process we specify for asset
volatility is general enough to capture popular stochastic volatility models, such as Hes-
ton (1993) or the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process employed by, for example, Stein and Stein
(1991). We allow an arbitrary instantaneous correlation of ⇢t between the shock to asset
returns, dBA(t), and the shock to asset volatility, dBv(t). The specification in Equation
(2) encompasses a wide range of stochastic volatility models popular in the option pricing
literature.8
6In Appendix A, we re-derive all of the subsequent results in the presence of asset jumps. Because we
find the results to be essentially unchanged, we focus on the simpler case of only stochastic volatility for the
sake of brevity.
7Implicit is that the volatility process satisfies the usual restrictions necessary to apply Ito¯’s Lemma.
8A short and certainly incomplete list includes Black and Scholes (1973), Heston (1993), and Bates
(1996).
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The instantaneous return on equity is computed via simple application of Ito¯’s Lemma:
dEt
Et
=  t
At
Dt
Dt
Et
· dAt
At
+
⌫t
Et
· d A,t
+
1
2Et
"
@2f
@A2t
d hAit +
@2f
d ( A,t)
2d
D
 fA
E
t
+
@2f
@A@ A,t
d hA,  Ait
#
(3)
where  t = @f/@At is the “delta” in option pricing, ⌫t = @f/@ A,t is the “vega” of the
option, and hXit denotes the quadratic variation process for an arbitrary stochastic process
Xt. Here we have ignored the sensitivity of the option value to the maturity of the debt.9 In
our applications, ⌧ will be large enough that this assumption is innocuous. All the quadratic
variation terms are of the order O(dt) and we collapse them to an unspecified function
q(At,  A,t; f), where the notation captures the dependence of the higher order Ito¯ terms on
the partial derivatives of the call option pricing function.
In reality, we do not observe At because it is the market value of assets. However, given
that the call option pricing function is monotonically increasing in its first argument, it is
safe to assume that f(·) is invertible with respect to this argument. We further assume that
the call pricing function is homogenous of degree one in its first two arguments, which is
a standard assumption in the option pricing literature. We define the inverse call option
formula as follows:
At
Dt
= g (Et/Dt, 1,  A,t, ⌧, rt)
⌘ f 1 (Et/Dt, 1,  A,t, ⌧, rt) (4)
9For simplicity, we also ignore sensitivity to the risk-free rate, which is trivially satisfied if we assume a
constant term structure.
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Equation (3) reduces returns to the following:10
dEt
Et
=
⌘LM(Et/Dt,1, A,t,⌧,rt)z }| {
 t · g
⇣
Et/Dt, 1,  
f
A,t, ⌧, rt
⌘
· Dt
Et
⇥dAt
At
+
⌫t
Et
· d A,t + q(At,  fA,t; f)dt
= LM (Et/Dt, 1,  A,t, ⌧, rt)⇥ dAt
At
+
⌫t
Et
· d A,t + q(At,  fA,t; f)dt (5)
For reasons that will become clear shortly, we call LM
⇣
Et/Dt, 1,  
f
A,t, ⌧, rt
⌘
the “leverage
multiplier.” When it is obvious, we will drop the functional dependence of the leverage
multiplier on leverage, etc., and instead denote it simply by LMt. In order to obtain a
complete law of motion for equity, we need to know the dynamics of volatility,  A,t, as
opposed to variance. Ito¯’s Lemma implies that the volatility process behaves as follows:
d A,t =
⌘s( A,t;µv , v)z }| {"
µv(t, vt)
2 A,t
   
2
v(t, vt)
8 3A,t
#
dt+
 v(t, vt)
2 A,t
dBv(t)
= s ( A,t;µv,  v) dt+
 v(t, vt)
2 A,t
dBv(t) (6)
Plugging Equations (2) and (6) into Equation (5) yields the desired full equation of motion
for equity returns:
dEt
Et
= [LMtµA(t) + s ( A,t;µv,  v) + q(At,  A,t; f)] dt
+LMt A,tdBA(t) +
⌫t
Et
 v(t,  A,t)
2 A,t
dBv(t) (7)
10Using the fact that f(·) is homogenous of degree 1 in its first argument also implies that:
 t = @f (At, Dt, A,t, ⌧, r) /@At = @f (At/Dt, 1, A,t, ⌧, r) /@(At/Dt)
So with an inverse option pricing formula, g(·) in hand we can define the delta in terms of leverage Et/Dt.
9
Because our empirical focus will be on daily equity and asset returns, we ignore the drift term
for equity. Typical daily equity returns are virtually zero on average, so for our purposes
ignoring the equity drift is harmless.11 Instantaneous equity returns then naturally derive
from Equation (7) with no drift:
dEt
Et
= LMt A,tdBA(t) +
⌫t
Et
 v(t,  A,t)
2 A,t
dBv(t) (8)
Suppose for a moment that we can ignore the contribution of asset volatility shocks, dBv(t),
to equity returns.
Assumption 1. For the purposes of daily equity return dynamics, we can ignore the follow-
ing term in Equation (8):
⌫t
Et
 v(t,  A,t)
2 A,t
dBv(t)
In Appendix A, we show that Assumption 1 is appropriate in a variety of option pricing
models.12 The intuition behind this result is as follows: mean reversion is embedded in any
reasonable model of volatility. In this case, the time it takes volatility to mean revert is
much shorter than typical debt maturities for firms. Thus, the cumulative asset volatility
over the life of the option (equity) is eﬀectively constant. In turn, the ⌫t term is nearly zero,
and so shocks to asset volatility get washed out as far as equity returns are concerned. In the
Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) case, this assumption holds exactly because asset volatility is
constant. Under Assumption 1, equity returns and instantaneous equity volatility are given
11Indeed, ignoring the drift when thinking about long-horizon asset returns (and levels) is not trivial.
12That is, when the underlying asset process has jumps, stochastic volatility, stochastic volatility and
jumps, etc.
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by:
dEt
Et
= LMt A,tdBA(t)
volt
✓
dEt
Et
◆
= LMt ⇥  A,t (9)
Equation (9) is our key relationship of interest. The equation states that equity volatility
(returns) is a scaled function of asset volatility (returns), where the function depends on
financial leverage, Dt/Et, as well as asset volatility over the life of the option (and the
interest rate). The moniker of the “leverage multiplier” should be clear now: LMt describes
how equity volatility is amplified by financial leverage. To provide some additional economic
intuition about the behavior of LMt, we now turn to exploring the shape of the leverage
multiplier in some specific settings, and the Black-Scholes-Merton model is a very natural
place to start.
2.2. The Shape of the Leverage Multiplier
2.2.1. Leverage Multiplier in the Black-Scholes-Merton World
It is straightforward to compute LM(·) when BSM is the relevant option pricing model. To
start, we fix annualized asset volatility to  A = 0.15, time to maturity of the debt ⌧ = 5, and
the risk-free rate r = 0.03. Figure 1 plots the leverage multiplier against financial leverage
(Dt/Et) in this case.
From Figure 1, we can see that the leverage multiplier is increasing in leverage. Intuitively,
when a firm is more leveraged, its equity option value is further from the money and asset
returns exceed equity returns by a larger degree. When leverage is zero (Dt/Et = 0), the
11
Figure 1: BSM Leverage Multiplier
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Notes: This figure plots the leverage multiplier in the BSM model. Annualized asset volatility is set to
 A = 0.15, the time to maturity of the debt is ⌧ = 5, and the annualized risk-free rate is r = 0.03.
leverage multiplier is one, because assets must be equal to equity. Next, in Figure 2 we
investigate how the BSM leverage multiplier changes as we vary the time to expiration and
volatility.
Let us begin with the case where debt maturity is held constant but volatility varies.
When volatility increases, the leverage multiplier decreases. In this case, the likelihood
that the equity is “in the money” rises with volatility and the eﬀect of leverage on equity
volatility is dampened. A similar argument holds when volatility is fixed and debt maturity
varies. Extending the maturity of the debt serves to dampen the leverage multiplier because
the equity has a better chance of expiring with value. The BSM model provides a useful
benchmark in understanding the economics of the leverage multiplier, but it also provides
a simple and easy way to compute a set of functions when evaluating LM(·). Our primary
objective is to estimate a simple functional form for LM(·) that is not restricted to the
assumptions of the BSM. However, we will ultimately be able to use the functions provided
12
Figure 2: BSM Leverage Multiplier with Varying  A and ⌧
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 501
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Debt to Equity
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
M
u
lt
ip
li
e
r
 
 
σ = 0 .1 , τ = 5
σ = 0 .2 , τ = 5
σ = 0 .1 , τ = 10
σ = 0 .2 , τ = 10
Notes: This figure plots the leverage multiplier in the BSM model. Annualized asset volatility takes on one
of two values  A 2 {0.1, 0.2}. The time to maturity of the debt also takes on two possible values ⌧ 2 {5, 10}.
The annualized risk-free rate is r = 0.03
by BSM as a starting point for constructing a flexible specification for LM(·).
2.2.2. The Leverage Multiplier in Other Option Pricing Settings
The purpose of this subsection is to get a sense of the shape of the leverage multiplier in
more complicated option pricing settings. Figure 3 summarizes this analysis visually.
The full details of how we constructed the leverage multiplier in each of the specific option
pricing models are found in Appendix A. In addition to the benchmark BSM case, Figure 3
plots the leverage multiplier in the Merton (1976) jump-diﬀusion model, the Heston (1993)
stochastic volatility model, and the stochastic volatility with jumps model employed by Bates
(1996) and Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997). Figure 3 shows that, for a wide range of leverage,
the shape of the leverage multiplier is roughly the same across option pricing models. So
13
Figure 3: The Leverage Multiplier in Other Option Pricing Models
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Notes: This figure plots the leverage multiplier in a variety of option pricing models. Full details of the
construction can be found in Appendix A. The upper left panel is the benchmark BSM Model. The upper
right panel is the Merton (1976) jump-diﬀusion model. The lower left panel is the Heston (1993) stochastic
volatility model. Finally, the lower right panel is a stochastic volatility with jumps model that is used by
Bates (1996) and Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997).
far, our exploration of the leverage multiplier has been in the context of continuous time.
However, our eventual econometric model will fall under the discrete time GARCH class of
models for assets. To understand how the leverage multiplier behaves in this setting, we now
turn to a Monte Carlo exercise involving GARCH option pricing.
2.2.3. The Appropriate Leverage Multiplier with GARCH and Non-Normality
Our Monte Carlo approach is motivated by option models estimated when the underlying
follows a GARCH type process, as in Barone-Adesi, Engle, and Mancini (2008). When
14
pricing options on GARCH processes, there is often no closed form solution for call prices,
necessitating the use of simulation techniques. First, we assume a risk-neutral return process
for assets. In our simulations, we adopt four diﬀerent asset processes: (i) a GARCH(1,1)
process with normally distributed innovations; (ii) a GARCH(1,1) process with t-distributed
innovations; (iii) an asymmetric GARCH(1,1) process with normally distributed innovations;
and (iv) an asymmetric GARCH(1,1) process with t-distributed errors. The asymmetric
GARCH process we use is the GJR process of Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993).
For completeness, we present these recursive volatility models:
GARCH :  2A,t = ! + ↵r
2
A,t 1 +   
2
A,t 1
GJR :  2A,t = ! + ↵r
2
A,t 1 +  r
2
A,t 11rA,t 1<0 +   
2
A,t 1
The GJR process captures the familiar pattern in equity returns of negative correlation
between volatility and returns; this correlation is captured by the asymmetry parameter,  .
In our parameterization of these processes, we set the asymmetry parameter to be quite large,
because this is one way to capture how risk-aversion aﬀects the risk-neutral asset process.
In addition, for the models with t-distributed innovations, we set the degrees of freedom to
six in order to fatten the tails of the asset return process. In order to ensure comparability
across models within our simulation, we change ! so that the unconditional volatility of all
the processes is 15 percent annually. Table 1 summarizes our parametrization.
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Table 1: Parameterizations for Simulated-Asset Processes
Parameter
Model ↵    
GARCH with Normal Errors 0.07 - 0.92
GARCH with t Errors 0.07 - 0.92
GJR with Normal Errors 0.022 0.18 0.884
GJR with t Errors 0.022 0.18 0.884
Notes: The table provides parameter values for the volatility models used to generate the leverage multiplier
in discrete time environments. We assume assets follow each of the four volatility models in the table above
and we then simulate the leverage multiplier according to each parametrization.
For each process, we simulate the asset process 10,000 times from an initial asset value of
A0 = 1. We assume the debt matures in two years and, for simplicity, set the risk-free rate to
zero. The simulation generates a set of terminal values, AT , which in turn generate an equity
value for each value of debt D.13 We then compute numerical derivatives to measure how the
equity value changes with respect to A0. Finally, we calculate the leverage multiplier implied
by each asset return process and plot it against the implied financial leverage in Figure 4.
The economics behind the shape of the leverage multiplier under various asset return
processes are subtle. The benchmark case of BSM is given by the blue line in Figure 4,
and it is easy to see that in a symmetric setting, making the tails of the asset distribution
longer via GARCH decreases the leverage multiplier for larger values of debt (the green and
red lines). For larger values of debt, extending the tails of the asset distribution serves the
same function as increasing volatility in the BSM case. When we introduce asset volatility
asymmetry via the GJR process, the leverage multiplier increases dramatically relative to
the BSM benchmark (turquoise and purple lines). Volatility asymmetry eﬀectively makes
the figure asset distribution left skewed, which shortens the right tail of the distribution and
13E = 110,000
P10,000
i=1 max(AT,i D, 0), where i is the index for each simulation run. Varying D generates
a variable range of leverage, D/E.
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Figure 4: Simulated Leverage Multiplier in Stochastic Volatility and Non-Normality
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Notes: The figure plots the simulated leverage multiplier under diﬀerent asset return process specifications.
We consider GARCH and GJR process, each with normally distributed and t distributed errors. The
unconditional volatility in all the models is 15 percent annually, the time to maturity of the debt is two
years, and the risk-free rate is set to zero. The parameters of each volatility model can be found in Table 1.
increases the leverage multiplier. In this case, leverage has a larger amplification on equity
volatility because high leverage corresponds to a much smaller likelihood the equity expires
“in the money.”
2.2.4. Three Properties of the Leverage Multiplier
In general, it is clear that the shape of the leverage multiplier is robust across a variety of
continuous time and discrete time option pricing models. More specifically, our preceding
analysis implies that the leverage multiplier satisfies at least three basic properties: (i) when
leverage is zero, the leverage multiplier has a value of one, (ii) the leverage multiplier is
weakly increasing in leverage, and (iii) the leverage multiplier is concave in leverage.
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As previously discussed, the first property is mechanical and true by definition. It is
slightly easier to prove the latter two properties within a specific option pricing framework,
though it has proven more diﬃcult to do so in a general setting. However, because we have
shown that the leverage multiplier satisfies these three properties in a number of diﬀerent
option pricing models, we believe these three properties are not model dependent and likely
derive from no arbitrage arguments. Perhaps more mildly, these properties should apply to
asset processes whose distributions are plausible in the real world (that is, not a degenerative
risk-neutral distribution with all the mass at some extreme point) and for reasonable levels of
leverage. The remainder of our analysis will take these three properties as given. With this
in mind, we propose a parameterized function to capture leverage amplification mechanisms
in a relatively “model-free” way.
2.3. A Flexible Leverage Multiplier
In the derivation of Equation (9), we did not assign specific functions to g(·) and  t. We
define gBSM(·) and  BSMt as the BSM inverse call and delta functions. We then propose the
following specification for the leverage multiplier:
LM
⇣
Dt/Et,  
f
A,t, ⌧, rt; 
⌘
=

 BSMt
⇣
Et/Dt, 1,  
f
A,t, ⌧, rt
⌘
⇥ gBSM
⇣
Et/Dt, 1,  
f
A,t, ⌧, rt
⌘
⇥ Dt
Et
  
(10)
In this case,   is the departure from the BSM model. When taking our model to data, it will
be an estimated parameter. One advantage of our proposed leverage multiplier in Equation
(10) is its relative simplicity in terms of computation, as the BSM delta and inverse call
functions are numerically tractable. We discuss these potential computation issues later in
Section 3.2.
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Figure 5: Leverage Multiplier for Diﬀerent Values  
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 501
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Debt to Equity
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
M
u
lt
ip
li
e
r
 
 
φ = 0 .5
φ = 1
φ = 1 .5
Notes: This figure plots the leverage multiplier according to the specification in (10) for diﬀerent values of
 . In our baseline case, the annualized  A is held constant at 0.15, ⌧ = 5, and r = 0.03.
It is worth emphasizing that our leverage multiplier simply uses a mathematical transfor-
mation of the BSM functions. For example, in a BSM world, gBSM(·) would be interpreted
as the asset-to-debt ratio, but for our model it is simply a function. Similarly,  BSMt in our
specification is not interpreted as the correct hedge ratio, but merely serves as a function for
our purposes. Let us now examine how our leverage multiplier changes for diﬀerent values
of  , which we plot in Figure 5.
Unsurprisingly, increasing   increases the leverage multiplier. For firms with a low value
of  , high levels of leverage have a small amplification eﬀect in terms of equity volatility.
Building on the intuition from the BSM case, we see that for these firms leverage plays a small
role in the moneyness of the equity, which likely corresponds to healthier firms. The converse
holds true as well, as firms with high   experience large equity volatility amplification, even
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Figure 6: Simulated Leverage Multiplier and Our Specification
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Notes: The figure plots the simulated leverage multiplier under diﬀerent asset return process specifications.
We consider GARCH and GJR process, each with normally distributed and t distributed errors. The
unconditional volatility in all the models is 15 percent annually, the time to maturity of the debt is two
years, and the risk-free rate is set to zero. The parameters of each volatility model can be found in Table 1.
In addition, we plot our leverage multiplier from specification (10) for diﬀerent values of   to demonstrate
that our model captures various asset return processes well.
for low levels of financial leverage.
To highlight the flexibility of our specification, we revisit the Monte Carlo exercise from
Section 2.2.3. Figure 6 plots the leverage multiplier in a GARCH option pricing setting, as
well as our leverage multiplier for a few diﬀerent values of  .
Figure 6 shows that varying   in our leverage multiplier specification captures various
asset return processes well. Increasing   is successful in matching the patterns in the leverage
multiplier that arise in stochastic volatility, asymmetric volatility, and non-normal settings.
Importantly, our flexible leverage multiplier also preserves the three necessary properties
outlined in Section 2.2.4. Raising the BSM leverage multiplier to an arbitrary power naturally
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preserves the condition for LM(·) to have a value of one when leverage is zero. It is also clear
from Figure 5 and Figure 6 that varying   preserves the concavity and increasing nature of
the BSM leverage multiplier.14 While our specification is seemingly simple, it is not a trivial
task to define a function that retains the flexibility of ours but also maintains the necessary
properties of the leverage multiplier. Our analysis in Section 2.2.1 also demonstrated that
LM is decreasing in asset volatility and time-to-maturity.15 Because our leverage multiplier
is a power function of the BSM multiplier, an additional advantage of our specification is
that it inherits these natural properties from the Black-Scholes-Merton model.
2.4. The Full Recursive Model
The preceding analysis motivates the use of our leverage multiplier in describing the relation-
ship between equity volatility and leverage. To make the model fully operational in discrete
time, we propose the following process for equity returns:
rE,t = LMt 1rA,t
rA,t =
p
hA,t"A,t, "A,t ⇠ D(0, 1)
hA,t = ! + ↵
✓
rE,t 1
LMt 2
◆2
+  
✓
rE,t 1
LMt 2
◆2
1rE,t 1<0 +  hA,t 1
LMt 1 =

4BSMt 1 ⇥ gBSM
⇣
Et 1/Dt 1, 1,  
f
A,t 1, ⌧
⌘
⇥ Dt 1
Et 1
  
(11)
14To be precise,   preserves the concavity so long as it is not too large, long-run asset volatility is not
too small, and ⌧ is not too small. In practice, this is not an issue, even for financial firms who have larger
amounts of leverage. When we estimate the model, we later verify that none of the fitted   result in violations
of this sort.
15Our analysis in Section 2.2.1 applied to the BSM model, but the notion that the leverage multiplier is
decreasing in both asset volatility and time to maturity holds more broadly. Merton (1974) shows that as the
time-to-maturity goes to infinity, the option becomes the same as the underlying, so the leverage multiplier
must decrease to its lower bound of one (Theorem 3). Similarly, the call option pricing formula is weakly
increasing in volatility (Theorem 8). So long as the rate of increase in the delta of the option w.r.t volatility
is slower than for the underlying option price, the leverage multiplier will be decreasing in asset volatility.
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We will call the specification described in Equation (11) as a “Structural GARCH” model.16
The parameter set for the Structural GARCH is ⇥ := (!,↵,  ,  , ), so there is only one extra
parameter compared to a vanilla GJR model. We will confront the issue of how to compute
⌧ and  fA,t 1 in the next section when describing the data and estimation techniques used in
our empirical work. We also introduce lags in the appropriate variables (e.g., the leverage
multiplier) to ensure that one-step ahead volatility forecasts are indeed in the previous day’s
information set. The model in (11) nests both a simple GJR model (  = 0) and the BSM
model (  = 1), and provides a statistical test of how leverage aﬀects equity volatility.17 This
is another attractive feature of our leverage multiplier from an econometric perspective, and
adds to the theoretically appealing qualities we highlighted in Section 2.3.
The equity return series will inherit volatility asymmetry from the asset return series,
an important feature of equity returns in the data.18 The recursion for equity returns (and
asset returns) in (11) is simple and straightforward to compute, yet powerful. For example,
when simulating this model, if a series of negative asset returns is realized (and hence nega-
tive equity returns since they share the same shock), volatility rises due to the asymmetric
specification inherent in the GJR. In that case, leverage also rises, increasing the leverage
multiplier and resulting in an even stronger amplification eﬀect for equity volatility. As we
16In reality our model is a Structural GARCH(1,1) model, because it includes a single lag of the squared
asset return and asset volatility. Incorporating a richer lag structure is straightforward, so that our model
can naturally be generalized to Structural GARCH(p, q) model as follows:
hA,t = ! +
pX
j=1
↵j
✓
rE,t j
LMt j 1
◆2
+
pX
j=1
 j
✓
rE,t j
LMt j 1
◆2
1rE,t j<0 +
qX
i=1
 ihA,t i
17  = 1 nests the BSM exactly if we use a constant forecast of asset volatility over the lifetime of the
option. As mentioned, we estimate this model against a model where we use a GJR forecast for  fA,t. The
results are similar, so we refer to the two without distinction.
18For example, it is has been shown that a GJR process for equity can replicate features of equity option
data like the volatility smirk.
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saw in the recent financial crisis, this was a key feature of the data, particularly for highly
leverage financial firms. Additionally, by letting   vary from firm-to-firm, we eﬀectively
allow a diﬀerent option pricing model to apply to the capital structure of each firm. This
flexibility is diﬃcult to achieve if we impose an option pricing model on the data a priori
because, as we showed,   allows us to move across diﬀerent classes of option pricing models.
To the extent that our leverage multiplier form captures various option pricing models, the
Structural GARCH allows us to infer a high frequency asset return series with stochastic
volatility in a relatively model-free way. Later, this will prove to be extremely useful for a
number of applications of the model.
We also wish to emphasize there are many ways to parameterize the observation that the
leverage multiplier is similar across option pricing models for the purposes of volatility mod-
eling. We have chosen a particular specification that balances parsimony with the underlying
economics, while still retaining useful statistical properties. However, the themes that under-
lie the Structural GARCH are broader than our specific econometric model. An additional
contribution of this paper is to provide a simple and economically grounded framework with
widespread application for modeling volatility and leverage jointly.
3. Data Description and Estimation Details
3.1. Data Description
We now turn to estimating the Structural GARCH model using equity return data. To
compute the leverage multiplier, we also need balance sheet information. Unless otherwise
noted, we obtain all of our data from Bloomberg. In particular, we define Dt as the book
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value of debt at time t.19 To avoid estimation issues inherent with quarterly data, we smooth
the book value of debt using an exponential average with smoothing parameter of 0.01. This
smoothing parameter value implies a half-life of approximately 70 days in terms of the weights
of the exponential average, which is reasonable for quarterly data.
The set of firms we analyze are financial firms over a period that spans from January 3,
1990 to February 14, 2014.20 The reasons we focus on financial firms are twofold: first, these
firms typically have extraordinarily high leverage and structural models have failed to model
these firms well. Second, given the high volatility in the recent crisis that was accompanied
by unprecedented leverage, this set of firms presents an important sector to model from a
systemic risk and policy perspective. To this end, one of the applications of our model that
we will explore in later sections involves systemic risk measurement of financials. In future
work, we hope to extend the set of firms we analyze.
3.2. Numerical Implementation
When estimating the full model, we use quasi-maximum likelihood and the associated stan-
dard errors for parameter estimates. In order to ensure a global optimum is reached, we
also conduct each maximum likelihood optimization over a grid of 24 diﬀerent starting val-
ues.21 Despite the relative simplicity of our model, quasi-maximum likelihood estimation is
still quite costly from a computational perspective. To see why, let us explicitly define our
19All liabilities are treated as exogenous and as if they have a single expiration. Liabilities are measured as
the book value of assets minus the book value of equity from quarterly accounting statements. Some models
use maturity measures directly however for financial firms many of the liabilities do not have contractual
liabilities. We discuss the issue of debt maturity below.
20A full description of the set of firms is contained in Appendix D.1.
21The Matlab code for estimation of the model via quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) with the correct
standard errors is available upon request.
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log-likelihood function from the specification in (11):
L
⇣
!,↵,  ,  , ; {rE,t, Et, Dt}Tt=2
⌘
:=  1
2
TX
t=2
"
log(2⇡) + log(hE,t) +
(rE,t)
2
hE,t
#
=  1
2
TX
t=2
"
log(2⇡) + log(LM2t 1hA,t) +
(rE,t)
2
LM2t 1hA,t
#
where all summations begin from t = 2 because the leverage multiplier contains lagged
equity and debt values. From our definition of the leverage multiplier, it is clear that a single
computation of LMt requires an inversion of the BSM call option formula. For a firm with
10 years of data, this means evaluating L(·) at a single parameter set requires approximately
10⇥252 = 2520 inversions of the BSM call option formula. In turn, maximizing a single firm’s
likelihood function typically involves 180 function evaluations, which means 2520 ⇥ 180 =
453, 600 inversions. As mentioned, we use 24 diﬀerent starting values to ensure a global
maximum is reached, two diﬀerent types of asset volatility over the life of the debt, and 30
diﬀerent debt maturities (more details follow). In total, this means for an average firm in our
sample, we must invert the BSM function 2520⇥ 280⇥ 24⇥ 2⇥ 30 = 1, 016, 064, 000 times,
which is computationally expensive given there is no closed form formula for the inverse
BSM function.22
To make the problem computational tractable, we estimate all of our models on the
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud. The computing unit we use is their latest generation
Linux based machine with 32 CPUs, and 60 GB of RAM. Estimation of each firm is done
using parallel processing, and the average firm takes about 80 minutes to estimate the full
model. Since we estimate the model for more than 80 firms, we use many diﬀerent computing
22Later in Section 6, we will simulate the Structural GARCHmodels thousands of times over long horizons,
also a computationally taxing task for similar reasons.
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units simultaneously to make the total time more reasonable (approximately 12 hours for all
firms).
The remaining issues are how to treat both the time to maturity of the debt ⌧ , the asset
volatility over the life of the debt  fA,t, and the risk-free rate, rt.
Time to Maturity of the Debt
An input to the leverage multiplier is time to maturity of the debt. Because the book value
of debt combines a number of diﬀerent debt maturities, we simply iterate over diﬀerent ⌧
during estimation. Specifically, we estimate the model for ⌧ 2 [1, 30], restricting ⌧ to take
on integer values. We keep the version of the model that attains the highest log-likelihood
function.
Risk Free Rate
To compute the leverage multiplier, we must also input the risk free rate over the life
of the debt. We do so by using a zero-curve provided by OptionsMetrics, which is derived
from BBA LIBOR rates and settlement prices of CME Eurodollar futures. We then linearly
interpolate (with flat endpoints beyond the maximum maturity) to determine the riskless
rate for a specific maturity.
Asset Volatility Over Life of Debt
We take two diﬀerent approaches for the computing the value of  fA,t. The first is to
use the unconditional volatility implied by the asset volatility series corresponding to the
unconditional volatility of a GJR process. Using a constant  fA,t in fact completely eliminates
any issues in ignoring the vega terms in our motivating derivation of the leverage multiplier
(see Equation (3)). The second approach is to use the GJR forecast over the life of the debt
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at each date t. It is straightforward to derive the closed form expression for this forecast.
We use both approaches for  fA,t and choose the model with the highest likelihood.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Cross-Sectional Summary
We begin by presenting a cross-sectional summary of the estimation results.23 Since the main
contribution of this paper is the leverage multiplier, Figure 7 plots the estimated time-series
of the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile leverage multipliers, across all firms.
As we can see, there is considerable cross-sectional heterogeneity in the leverage multi-
plier, even within financial firms. It appears that across all firms, the leverage multiplier
moves with the business cycle, which is not surprising given that leverage itself tends to do
so as well. In the top quartile of firms, leverage amplified equity volatility by a factor of
eight during the financial crisis. Evidently, for this set of firms, the leverage amplification
mechanism has remained high in the years following the crisis.
Table 1 shows cross-sectional summary statistics for the point estimates of the Structural
GARCH model. In our model, the first four estimates represent the GJR parameters for the
asset return series. It is not surprising then that they resemble those found in equity returns.
The parameter ! is an order of magnitude smaller than usual, but this is natural because
asset returns are less volatile than equity returns and ! is a determinant of the unconditional
volatility. The asset process is indeed stationary, as seen by the combination of ↵,  ,   and
23There were 11 firms where the estimated   coeﬃcient had convergence issues and hit the lower bound
for  . We discuss these firms specifically in Appendix D.2. The main unifying theme with these firms is that
their leverage is both low and nearly constant through the time series, so identification of   is diﬃcult. We
exclude these firms for the remainder of the analysis.
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Figure 7: Time Series of Leverage Multiplier Across Quartiles
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Notes: The figure plots the quartiles of the estimated leverage multiplier across firms, and through time.
The plot begins in January 1998 and ends in February 2014. The full set of firms we analyze can be found
in Appendix D.1
standard results on the stationarity of GARCH processes. One subtle but key diﬀerence in
the current estimates is the parameter  , which is higher than it is for equity returns in this
subset of stocks. Recall that   dictates the correlation between volatility and returns, and
thus it appears that the volatility asymmetry we observe in equity is somewhat dampened in
asset returns. In one application of the model, we will explore this idea further as it pertains
to the classical leverage eﬀect of Black (1976) and Christie (1982).
The new parameter in our model is  . The third and fourth columns of Table 2 show  
is statistically diﬀerent than zero for a majority of firms. Therefore, the eﬀect of leverage on
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Table 2: Cross-Sectional Summary of Structural GARCH Parameter Estimates
Parameter Mean Mean t-stat % with |t| > 1.64
! 2.7e-06 1.70 47.2
↵ 0.0458 3.07 86.1
  0.0721 2.91 80.6
  0.9024 80.08 100
  0.9834 4.00 73.6
Notes: This table provides a cross-sectional summary of the parameter estimates from the Structural GARCH
model as defined in Equation (11). The full set of firms we analyze can be found in Appendix D.1.
equity volatility via our leverage multiplier appears to be substantial for a large number of
financial firms. Interestingly, the average   is slightly less than one, as the BSM model would
suggest. These results are roughly consistent with the findings of Schaefer and Strebulaev
(2008) who find that while the Merton (1974) model does poorly in predicting the levels
of credit spreads, it is successful in generating the correct hedge ratios across the capital
structure of the firm. In our context, we interpret their finding and our estimation of   to
mean that the Merton model does well in recovering the daily returns of assets well, even if
it is not able to pinpoint the level of assets.
4.2. Aggregation
4.2.1. Aggregate Leverage Multiplier
We aggregate our results across firm by creating three indices: 1) a value-weighted average
equity volatility index, 2) a value-weighted average asset volatility index, and 3) an aggregate
leverage multiplier. The aggregate leverage multiplier is simply the ratio of the equity
volatility index to the asset volatility index. The weights used in creating each respective
index are derived from equity valuations. Figure 8 plots these three time series. Again, it
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Figure 8: Aggregate Equity Volatility, Asset Volatility, and Leverage Multiplier
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Notes: This figure plots the value-weighted average across all firms of our estimated equity volatility and
asset volatility. The weights used in creating each respective index are based on equity valuations. The
aggregate leverage multiplier is then the ratio of the aggregate equity volatility index to the asset volatility
index.
is clear that there is a cyclicality in the aggregated leverage multiplier. A pressing issue in
the wake of the financial crisis is the role of leverage and the health of the financial sector.
Since our model provides estimates of leverage amplification in terms of equity volatility (as
well as asset volatility), we focus on these aggregated time-series through the financial crisis
in Figure 9.
It is clear that the rise in equity volatility for the aggregate financial sector began in the
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Figure 9: Aggregate Equity Volatility, Asset Volatility, and Leverage Multiplier During
Financial Crisis
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Notes: This figure plots the value-weighted average across all firms of our estimated equity volatility and
asset volatility. The weights used in creating each respective index are based on equity valuations. The
aggregate leverage multiplier is then the ratio of the aggregate equity volatility index to the asset volatility
index. Our time period focuses on the financial crisis from 2007 to mid-2009.
summer of 2007. However the rise in asset volatility did not really occur until late in 2008.
The increase in leverage in 2007 was partly an increase in aggregate liabilities and partly
a fall in equity valuation. After the fall of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., asset volatility
rose dramatically as well and the leverage multiplier continued to rise before stabilizing in
the spring of 2009.
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5. The Leverage Eﬀect
We now turn to our first application of the Structural GARCH: the leverage eﬀect. The
leverage eﬀect of Black (1976) and Christie (1982) documents the negative correlation that
exists between equity returns and equity volatility. One possible explanation for this fact is
that when a firm experiences a fall in equity, its financial leverage mechanically rises, the
company becomes riskier, and volatility rises.
A second explanation points to the role of risk premiums in describing the negative cor-
relation between equity returns and equity volatility (e.g. French, Schwert, and Stambaugh
(1987)). In this explanation, a rise in future volatility raises the required return on equity,
leading to an immediate decline in the stock price. The Structural GARCH model provides
a natural framework to explore these issues econometrically.24
Recall that the Structural GARCH model delivers an estimate of the daily return of
assets.25 Any correlation between asset volatility and asset returns can not be due to financial
leverage. So, if a correlation does exist, it must be attributed to a risk-premium argument.
When applying the GJR volatility model to a given time series of returns, the   parameter
is one way to measure the correlation between the volatility and returns (e.g. a higher  
corresponds to more negative correlation). Therefore, we would expect the GJR   estimated
from equity returns to be larger than the same parameter estimated from asset returns.
Indeed, the median   for equity returns is 0.0811 and the median   for asset returns is
24Other econometric studies of the leverage eﬀect include Bekaert and Wu (2000). The diﬀerence in our
approach is that we allow debt for the firm to be risky, as in the Merton (1974) model.
25Again, this relies on a few assumptions. First, our specification ignores the eﬀect of changes in long-run
asset volatility on daily equity returns. Second, we assume that the book value of debt adequately captures
the outstanding liabilities of the firm. For example, we do not consider non-debt liabilities in our baseline
specification. Still, the Structural GARCH model is, at worst, eﬀective in at least partially unlevering the
firm.
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0.0676. For our subsample of firms, financial leverage accounts for roughly 17 percent of the
leverage eﬀect.
To put a bit more structure on the implications of Structural GARCH and the leverage
eﬀect, we run the following cross-sectional regression:
 E,i    A,i = a+ b⇥D/Ei + errori (12)
where  E,i and  A,i are the estimated GJR asymmetry parameter for firm i’s equity returns
and firm i’s asset returns respectively. D/Ei is the mean debt to equity ratio for firm i
over the sample period. The logic behind the regression in (12) is simple — to the extent
that leverage contributes to equity volatility asymmetry, firms with higher leverage should
experience a larger reduction in volatility asymmetry after unlevering the firm. Table 3
presents the results.
Table 3: Equity Asymmetry versus Asset Asymmetry
Variable Coeﬃcient Value t-stat R2
b 0.0016 3.18 13.04%
Notes: This table presents the cross-sectional regression described in Equation (12). We regress the diﬀerence
between the asymmetric volatility coeﬃcient for equity and assets ( E,i    A,i) on the mean of the debt to
equity ratio for each firm in our sample.
As expected, firms with higher average leverage have a larger gap between their equity
and asset asymmetry. As we saw before, there is still a substantial amount of asset volatility
asymmetry (the median   parameter for assets is 0.0676), which is helps explain why the
R2 is not higher. At the asset level, firms with higher volatility asymmetry should have
higher risk premiums. Thus, as a rough quantitative exercise, we run the following two-stage
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regression:
Stage 1: rAi,t = c+  Amkt,irEmkt,t + ei,t
Stage 2:  A,i = e+ f ⇥  Amkt,i + "i (13)
where rEmkt is the return on the equity market index. Stage 1 of the regression is designed
to deliver a measure of firms’s risk premium through its CAPM beta.26 The coeﬃcient f in
the Stage 2 regression is the main variable of interest. A positive value corroborates the risk
premium story for volatility asymmetry. The results of the two-stage regression are found
in Table 4.
Table 4: Risk-Premium Eﬀect on Asset Asymmetry
Variable Coeﬃcient Value t-stat R2
f 0.0190 1.35 2.62%
Notes: This table presents the two-stage regression results in Equation (13). The first stage regression
estimates, for each firm’s asset return series, the equity market beta. The second stage regresses a measure
of asset volatility asymmetry, the GJR asset  , on the regression coeﬃcient from Stage 1.
Unsurprisingly, firms with higher market betas have higher asset volatility asymmetry.
Though the results are weak, we view them as qualitative confirmation for how the Structural
GARCH unlevers the firm. Part of the reason for the standard error of our estimate of f is
that we compute  Amkt,i at the firm level, and it is well known that betas are more precisely
measured at the portfolio level. In addition, Bekaert and Wu (2000) attribute a portion
of firm-level volatility asymmetry to covariance asymmetry between the market and the
firm’s equity. Our cross-sectional investigation does not include this (or other) potential
26Note that since we are interested in the cross-sectional behavior of  A,i we are not concerned with using
the return on the equity market. If, for example, we used some proxy for a broad market asset market index,
only the magnitude of the coeﬃcient f would change.
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explanations, and is outside the scope of this paper. We now turn to using the Structural
GARCH model to measure systemic risk.
6. Systemic Risk Measurement
Given the unprecedented rise in leverage and equity volatility during the financial crisis of
2007-09, systemic risk measurement is a natural application of the Structural GARCH model.
Consider the following thought experiment: Following a negative shock to equity value, the
financial leverage of the firm mechanically rises. In a simple asymmetric GARCH model
for equity, the rise in volatility following a negative equity return is invariant to the capital
structure of the firm. However, in the Structural GARCH model, the leverage multiplier will
be higher following a negative equity return. Thus, equity volatility will be more sensitive to
even slight rises in asset volatility. In simulating the model, this mechanism would manifest
itself if the firm experiences a sequence of negative asset shocks. Due to asset volatility
asymmetry, a sequence of negative asset returns increases asset volatility. In turn, there may
potentially be explosive equity volatility since the leverage multiplier will be large in this
case. Casual observation of equity volatility and leverage during the crisis clearly supports
such a sequence of events.
6.1. Traditional SRISK
In order to embed this appealing feature of the Structural GARCH model into systemic
risk measurement, we adapt the SRISK metric of Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Acharya,
Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2012). The reader should refer to these studies for
an in-depth discussion of SRISK, but we will provide a brief summary here. Qualitatively,
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SRISK is an estimate of the amount of capital that an institution would need in order
to function normally in the event of another financial crisis. To compute SRISK, we first
compute a firm’s marginal expected shortfall (MES), which is the expected loss of a firm
when the overall market declines a given amount over a given time horizon.27 In turn, MES
requires us to simulate a bivariate process for the firm’s equity return, denoted rEi,t, and the
market’s equity return, denoted rEm,t. The bivariate process we adopt is described as follows:
rEm,t =
q
hEm,t"m,t
rEi,t =
q
hEi,t
⇣
⇢i,t"M,t +
q
1  ⇢2i,t⇠i,t
⌘
= LMi,t 1
q
hAi,t
⇣
⇢i,t"M,t +
q
1  ⇢2i,t⇠i,t
⌘
("m,t, ⇠i,t) ⇠ F (14)
where the shocks ("m,t, ⇠i,t) are independent and identically distributed over time and have
zero mean, unit variance, and zero covariance. We do not assume the two shocks are in-
dependent, however, and allow them to have extreme tail dependence nonparametrically.28
The processes hEm,t, hEi,t and ⇢i,t represent the conditional variance of the market, the condi-
tional variance of the firm, and the conditional correlation between the market and the firm,
respectively. It is important to note that under the Structural GARCH model, we are really
estimating correlations between shocks to the equity market index and shocks to firm asset
returns. Generically, once the bivariate process in (14) is fully specified, we compute a six
month MES (henceforth LRMES for “long-run” marginal expected shortfall) by simulating
the joint processes for the firm and the market (with bootstrapped shocks) and conditioning
27Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2012) provide an economic justification for why marginal
expected shortfall is the proper measure of systemic risk in the banking system.
28See Brownlees and Engle (2012) for complete details.
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on the event that the market declines by 40 percent. Incorporating the Structural GARCH
model into LRMES is simple. As stated in Equation (14), we simply assume the volatility
process for firm equity returns follows a Structural GARCH model.29 Finally, we assume
that equity market volatility follows a familiar GJR(1,1) process and that correlations follow
a DCC(1,1) model.
Once we have an estimate for the LRMES of a firm on a given day, we compute its capital
shortfall in a crisis as follows:
CSi,t = kDebti,t   (1  k)(1  LRMESi,t)Ei,t (15)
where Debti,t is the book value of debt outstanding on the firm, Ei,t is the market value of
equity, and k is a prudential level of equity relative to assets. In our applications, we take
k = 8 percent and, as is conventional in risk metrics such as VaR, we use positive values
of LRMESi,t to represent declines in the firm’s value. For example, if firm i is expected to
lose 60 percent of its equity in a crisis, its LRMES will be 60 percent. Thus, positive values
of capital shortfall mean the firm will be short of capital in a crisis. Finally, we define the
SRISK of a firm as:
SRISKi,t = max(CSi,t, 0)
The parameters governing the market volatility and firm-market correlation are estimated
recursively and allowed to change daily. However, due to the computational burden of
estimating the Structural GARCH recursively each day, we use the full sample to estimate the
Structural GARCH parameters. In future versions of SRISK measurement with Structural
29Eﬃcient simulation of a bivariate Structural GARCH process is, however, not trivial. The MATLAB©
code for this purpose is available from the authors upon request. All parameters of the model are estimated
using our full sample of data for each firm.
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GARCH, we hope to estimate all parameters of the bivariate process recursively. In the
interest of brevity, we choose to focus on one firm: Bank of America.
To start, Figure 10 plots the LRMES for Bank of America under using both the Struc-
tural GARCH, as well as a vanilla GJR model of univariate returns.
Figure 10: LRMES for Bank of America
Notes: The figure above plots the Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES) of Bank of America. The
purple line is the LRMES using a standard GJR model for returns. The orange line is the same calculation
using the Structural GARCH model. The sample period is from January 2000 to November 2011.
It is obvious that the Structural GARCH induces a higher MES than a standard asym-
metric volatility model. The reasons for this pattern are due to the leverage amplification
mechanism built into the model directly. In the low-volatility period from 2004-2007, the
Structural GARCH model delivers a LRMES nearly double the value that comes from a
standard GJR. Even in this period of low leverage, there are negative equity paths in the
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Structural GARCH model that result in increases in leverage, which in turn result in higher
volatility, and therefore paths where equity suﬀers large losses. There is much less of a scope
for this type of leverage spiral in low volatility/leverage periods in our typical volatility mod-
els. To focus in on the recent financial crisis, we translate our LRMES calculations into
SRISK and plot the resulting series from starting in 2007 in Figure 11.
Figure 11: SRISK for Bank of America
Notes: The figure above plots the SRISK of Bank of America from November 2006 to November 2011. The
units of the y-axis are millions of USD. The blue line uses a standard GJR model for returns. The green line
is the same calculation using the Structural GARCH model.
Figure 11 illustrates why the Structural GARCH model may provide useful in terms of
providing early warning signals of threats to financial stability. The results echo the dynamics
of LRMES under the Structural GARCH specification versus a standard GJR model. As
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early as January 2007, the SRISK (using Structural GARCH) of Bank of America starts
to rise and hovers around $20 billion. On the other hand, SRISK derived from a standard
asymmetric volatility model shows no (expected) capital shortfalls until late 2007 and early
2008. Again, the success of the Structural GARCH along this dimension rests with the
inherent leverage-volatility connection within the model. Qualitatively, the volatility and
leverage link is apparent and has been discussed extensively in the media and the academic
literature. Quantitatively, this link has been hard to pin down. The results in Figure 11
are evidence that the Structural GARCH model is, at very least, a partial resolution of this
issue.
6.2. Structural GARCH and the Probability of Default
While the SRISK framework provides a way to assess the capital deficiencies of financial
firms in a crisis, an alternative way to explore this issue is to ask the following: how likely is
a firm to go bankrupt if crisis occurs? To answer this question, we use the same simulation
machinery as in our SRISK analysis. Namely, for a given date, we condition on the market
falling 40 percent over six months, and then we simulate future return paths of the firm
using the bivariate specification in (14). We then compute the (conditional) probability of
a firm going bankrupt as the proportion of simulated paths where bankruptcy occurs (i.e.
when equity valuation hits zero). Our simulations again use two competing volatility models
for returns: (i) the Structural GARCH and (ii) a standard GJR volatility model. For the
purpose of illustration, we conduct this analysis for Bank of America on August 29, 2008.
Table 5 contains statistics on Bank of America’s bankruptcy paths over various horizons
and under both models. The connection between volatility and leverage is clearly seen in this
setting as well, as the likelihood of Bank of America going bankrupt is five times higher under
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Table 5: Conditional Probability of Default
Structural GARCH Regular GJR
Total # of Paths 453 453
# of Bankruptcies 45 9
Probability of Bankruptcy 9.93% 1.99%
Avg. Time to Bankruptcy 89.4 91.2
Min Time to Bankruptcy 42 57
Max Time to Bankruptcy 126 126
Notes: This table contains basic summary statistics for Bank of America’s simulated bankruptcy paths
starting from August 29, 2008. The simulations are: (i) over a six month horizon; (ii) conducted using the
Structural GARCH and a GJR model; (iii) and are conditional on a drop of 40 percent in the aggregate
market over the same timeframe. The number of simulations is 1841.
the Structural GARCH model relative to the GJR model. At the end of August 2008, the
Structural GARCH model indicated that Bank of America had a nearly 10 percent chance
of going bankrupt should a crisis occur over the next six months, whereas the GJR model
suggests only a 2 percent chance of this outcome. This is because the GJR model cannot
hope to capture how leverage increases the future risk of the firm and makes bankruptcy
more likely as the firm’s leverage explodes. In addition, the minimum time to bankruptcy
and the average time to bankruptcy are shorter in the Structural GARCH model, which
is another way of depicting the type of volatility-leverage spirals our model is designed to
encompass.
6.3. A New Measure of Systemic Risk: Precautionary Capital
Based on our preceding analysis of SRISK, it is clear that accounting for the interaction
between volatility and leverage is extremely important. Our model provides a simple way to
capture the nonlinear way in which increasing leverage increases current and future risk to
equity holders, and vice versa. SRISK in one sense asks how much trouble would a financial
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firm be in the future if there is another crisis? However, within our framework we can ask a
related, yet slight diﬀerent, question: how much capital would the firm have to raise today
to ensure they survive another crisis? In other words, our model provides a quantitative way
to explore potential government policies that trade oﬀ between a firm holding precautionary
capital buﬀers (crisis prevention) and the amount the firm would need should a crisis occur
(bailouts). In our last application of the Structural GARCH model, we propose a new
measure of systemic risk that we call “precautionary capital.”
Let’s start with a simple framework for understanding the core issues. Our ultimate goal
is to think about the diﬀerence between today’s equity, and how much equity the firm should
have today to avoid a crisis in the future. Denote today’s actual equity as eE0, and book
value of debt is D0. Suppose further that, because of an equity injection, it is possible to
change today’s equity value from eE0 to a diﬀerent equity level of E0.
Given initial levels of debt and equity, we then define the likelihood that future equity
value, ET , falls above any positive value x, conditional on a crisis:
f(x;E0, D0) := P(ET   x|crisis) (16)
In general, we allow the function f(·) to depend on the initial value of leverage, i.e. on
E0 and D0. As with SRISK, our conditioning event of a crisis is a 40 percent drop in the
aggregate stock market over the next six months.
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If we want the equity to asset ratio to be fixed in a crisis, it must be that:
k =
ET
ET +D0
,
ET =
kD0
1  k
For ease of presentation, define the value of future of equity that meets the capital require-
ment as ET (k,D0) := (kD0)/(1   k). Unless necessary, we drop the functional dependence
of ET on k and D0. Next, suppose we want to have some level of confidence, ↵ 2 [0, 1], that
the firm meets a capital requirement of k in a crisis. Using the function f(·), we define the
value E⇤0 such that:
f(ET ;E
⇤
0 , D0) = ↵ (17)
Finally, we define precautionary capital as the diﬀerence between E⇤0 and the true value of
today’s equity:
PC(k,↵; eE0, D0) := E⇤0   eE0 (18)
In other words, precautionary capital measures how much additional capital would need to
be added (or subtracted) to the equity of the firm to ensure, with a level of confidence of ↵,
that it meets its capital requirement in a crisis.
Computing E⇤0 and PC(k,↵;D0) involves solving a complicated nonlinear root problem.
It requires us to first compute the quantile function of ET as a function of E0 and D0, then
to invert this function to solve for E⇤0 . The problem is slightly easier when we are in the
GARCH class of models. In this case, the quantile function will be invariant to the initial
leverage of the firm. In the case of the Structural GARCH, the situation is more complicated,
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since the future return distribution depends crucially on today’s leverage.
The central idea behind using Structural GARCH in measuring precautionary capital
is precisely that adding equity to the firm today alters the quantiles of the future return
distribution. Because the leverage multiplier is increasing in leverage, reducing leverage
increases the likelihood the firm will meet its capital requirement. The eﬀect is further
enhanced by the fact that the leverage multiplier is concave in leverage. On the other hand,
in a model without the volatility-leverage connection, reducing current leverage will not
reduce future risk.30
Choosing k In order to compute precautionary capital, we must also select a value of
k that we’d like to ensure the firm meets in the event of a crisis. We choose a capital
requirement of k = 2 percent, which roughly translates to a leverage ratio of 50. The reason
for this particular capital requirement is simple: a leverage ratio of 50 seems to correspond to
when a financial firm ceases its normal function (e.g. Lehman Brothers). Broadly speaking,
the real eﬀects of bank failures seem to take eﬀect when financial firms stop providing their
basic services; thus, k = 2 percent can be thought of as a bankruptcy condition. Obviously,
many diﬀerent target capital ratios are also defensible.
6.3.1. Example: Bank of America
To make our idea more clear, we compute precautionary capital for Bank of America. For
this particular exercise, we assume we are standing on October 1, 2008. In other words, we
use initial values of D0 and eE0 as if we are at this point in time. Early October 2008 is of
natural interest because it was just before the peak of the financial crises.
30Mathematically, this means that in the Structural GARCH, the function f(·) depends on leverage. In
the GARCH family of volatility models, f(·) does not depend on leverage.
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Figure 12: Precautionary Capital: Bank of America on 10/1/2008
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Notes: The figure above plots, for Bank of America, the likelihood of meeting a capital requirement against
precautionary capital. The simulation date is on October 1, 2008. The debt level of the firm is $1.6701
trillion. The true value of equity for the firm on this date is $173.87 billion. The simulation horizon is six
months and the number of simulations is 1841. Each set of simulations is conditioned on a drop of 40 percent
in the aggregate stock market, and the same set of market and firm shocks is used for each simulation set —
the only diﬀerence is starting leverage. The curve in blue (green) is generated using a standard asymmetric
GARCH model (Structural GARCH).
In Figure 12, we compute precautionary capital for diﬀerent confidence levels. The x-axis
in the plot is precautionary capital, or the size of a potential capital injection. The y-axis
describes how likely the firm is to meet a k = 2 percent capital requirement, for each level
of precautionary capital. The curve in blue depicts our calculation of precautionary capital
using a standard asymmetric GARCH model. The curve in green is the same computation,
but uses the Structural GARCH model.
Figure 12 is useful because it allows a regulator to first choose a level of confidence for
Bank of America to meet its capital requirement. The regulator can then say how much
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capital Bank of America would have needed on October 1, 2008 to be sure it meets this
capital requirement if a crisis should occur in the next six months. For instance, according
to a standard asymmetric GARCH model, in order to be 90 percent sure that Bank of
America would meet a 2 percent capital requirement, we would have needed to inject nearly
$600 billion of equity in October 2008. This number is large because normal GARCH models
ignore the volatility-leverage connection. According to the Structural GARCH model, we
would have needed to add about $220 billion to be 90 percent certain that Bank of America
would meet its capital requirement.
With Structural GARCH, the leverage reduction of holding more capital results in lower
volatility, lower beta and lower probability of failure, a very sensible outcome, but one which
is not present in ordinary volatility models. In lieu of the advantages from reducing leverage,
we believe these results imply that financial firms should be subject to a risk-based capital
adequacy ratio for total leverage. Precautionary capital through the Structural GARCH lens
provides a method to compute this type of capital adequacy ratio in a quantitatively precise
manner.
7. Conclusion
This paper has provided a econometric approach to disentangle the eﬀects of leverage on
equity volatility. The Structural GARCH model we propose is rooted in the classical Merton
(1974) structural model of credit, but departs from it in a flexible yet parsimonious way.
In doing so, we are able to deliver high frequency asset return and asset volatility series.
Our particular econometric parameterization is only one way in which to use the contingent
claims analysis of Merton (1974) to capture the volatility-leverage connection; however, we
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believe the larger contribution of the current paper is to provide a more general framework
through which to approach the problem.
Although we applied the model in two diﬀerent settings, asymmetric volatility and sys-
temic risk measurement, there are a variety of other settings in which our model can be
used. For example, our analysis has centered on using structural models of credit to un-
derstand equity volatility dynamics; however, structural models of credit also make strong
predictions for the volatility of credit spreads. Our framework may provide a better way to
measure credit spread or credit default swap volatility by using the volatility-leverage con-
nection highlighted in this paper, as well as observable equity shocks. Moreover, since the
Structural GARCH model provides daily asset return and asset volatility series, it should
also improve hedge ratios when looking at the sensitivity of a firm’s debt value to the same
firm’s equity value. In corporate finance, an interesting avenue of research would be to ex-
amine optimal leverage ratios, taking into account the eﬀect that the leverage multiplier has
on equity volatility. In asset pricing, one might explore whether firms with high leverage
multipliers are priced diﬀerently than firms with low leverage multipliers. The Structural
GARCH model is an econometric model that can be used to explore all of these ideas.
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A. Appendix: The Leverage Multiplier and Assumption
1 Under Diﬀerent Option Pricing Models
In this appendix, we do three things. First, we add jumps to the asset process. Second, we explore
whether stochatic volatility and/or jumps change the conclusions drawn in the main text regarding
using Equation (9) as a model of equity returns. Finally, we confirm that jumps and stochastic
volatility do not change the general shape of the leverage multiplier, and so our specification remains
flexible enough to be accurate in these settings. Through this exposition, the steps to construct
Figure 3 will also become clear. In order to accomplish these tasks, it will be useful to essentially
start from scratch, and assign a generalized process for assets. As such, the reader may find many
parts repetitive from the main text, but we take this approach for the sake of completeness.
A.1. Motivating the Model
Adding jumps means we re-define the equity value as follows:
Et = f (At, Dt, A,t, JA, NA, ⌧, rt) (19)
where f(·) is an unspecified call option function, At is the current market value of assets, Dt is the
current book value of outstanding debt,  A,t is the (potentially stochastic) volatility of the assets.
⌧ is the life of the debt, and finally, rt is the annualized risk-free rate at time t. Additionally, JA
and NA are processes that describe discontinuous jumps in the underlying assets. Next, we specify
the following generic process for assets and variance:
dAt
At
= [µA(t)   µJ ]dt+  A,tdBA(t) + JAdNA(t)
d 2A,t = µv(t, A,t)dt+  v(t, A,t)dBv(t) (20)
where dBA(t) is a standard Brownian motion.  A,t captures time-varying asset volatility. We also
capture potential jumps in asset values via Ja andNA(t). log (1 + JA) ⇠ N
 
log [1 + µJ ]   2J/2, 2J
 
and Nt is a Poisson counting process with intensity  . The relative price jump size JA determines
the percentage change in the asset price caused by jumps, and the average asset jump size is µJ . We
assume the jump size, JA, is independent of NA(t), BA(t), and Bv(t). Similarly, the asset Poisson
counting process NA(t) is assumed to be independent of BA(t) and Bv(t). We allow an arbitrary
instantaneous correlation of ⇢t between the shock to asset returns, dBA(t), and the shock to asset
volatility, dBv(t).
The instantaneous return on equity is computed via simple application of Ito¯’s Lemma for
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Poisson processes:
dEt
Et
=  t
At
Dt
Dt
Et
· dAt
At
+
⌫t
Et
· d A,t + 1
2Et
"
@2f
@A2t
d hAit +
@2f
d ( A,t)
2d
D
 fA
E
t
+
@2f
@A@ A,t
d hA, Ait
#
+

EJt   Et
Et
 
dNA(t) (21)
where t = @f (At, Dt, A,t, ⌧, r) /@At is the “delta” in option pricing, ⌫t = @f (At, Dt, A,t, ⌧, r) /@ A,t
is the so-called “vega” of the option, and hXit denotes the quadratic variation process for an arbi-
trary stochastic process Xt. Additionally, EJt is the value of equity for an asset jump of JA = J .
Hence, EJt is itself a random variable. Once again, we have ignored the sensitivity of the option
value to the maturity of the debt. All the quadratic variation terms are of the order O(dt) and
henceforth we collapse them to an unspecified function q(At, A,t; f), where the notation captures
the dependence of the higher order Ito¯ terms on the partial derivatives of the call option pricing
function.
The call option pricing function is still monotonically increasing in its first argument, so it is
safe to assume that f(·) is invertible with respect to this argument. We further assume that the
call pricing function is homogenous of degree one in its first two arguments. Define the inverse call
option formula as follows:
At
Dt
= g (Et/Dt, 1, A,t, JA, NA, ⌧, rt)
⌘ f 1 (Et/Dt, 1, A,t, JA, NA, ⌧, rt) (22)
Thus, Equation (21) reduces returns to the following:31
dEt
Et
=
⌘LM(Et/Dt,1, A,t,⌧,rt)z }| {
 t · g
⇣
Et/Dt, 1, 
f
A,t, ⌧, rt
⌘
· Dt
Et
⇥dAt
At
+
⌫t
Et
· d A,t + q(At, fA,t; f)dt+

EJt   Et
Et
 
dNA(t)
= LM (Et/Dt, 1, A,t, ⌧, rt)⇥ dAt
At
+
⌫t
Et
· d A,t + q(At, fA,t; f)dt+

EJt   Et
Et
 
dNA(t) (23)
Henceforth, when it is obvious, we will drop the functional dependence of the leverage multiplier on
leverage, etc. and instead denote it simply by LMt. In order to obtain a complete law of motion
31Using the fact that f(·) is homogenous of degree 1 in its first argument also implies that
 t = @f (At, Dt, A,t, ⌧, r) /@At = @f (At/Dt, 1, A,t, ⌧, r) /@(At/Dt)
So with an inverse option pricing formula, g(·) in hand we can define the delta in terms of leverage Et/Dt.
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for equity, we use Ito¯’s Lemma to derive the volatility process:
d A,t =
⌘s( A,t;µv , v)z }| {"
µv(t, vt)
2 A,t
   
2
v(t, vt)
8 3A,t
#
dt+
 v(t, vt)
2 A,t
dBv(t)
= s ( A,t;µv, v) dt+
 v(t, vt)
2 A,t
dBv(t) (24)
Plugging Equations (20), (24) into Equation (23) yields the desired full equation of motion for equity
returns:
dEt
Et
= [LMtµA(t) + s ( A,t;µv, v) + q(At, A,t; f)] dt
+LMt A,tdBA(t) +
⌫t
Et
 v(t, A,t)
2 A,t
dBv(t) +

EJt   Et
Et
 
dNA(t) (25)
Since typical daily equity returns are virtually zero on average, we can continue to ignore the equity
drift term. Instantaneous equity returns then naturally derive from Equation (25) with no drift:
dEt
Et
= LMt A,tdBA(t) +
⌫t
Et
 v(t, A,t)
2 A,t
dBv(t) +

EJt   Et
Et
 
dNA(t) (26)
Our ultimate object of interest is the instantaneous volatility of equity, but in order to obtain
a complete expression for equity volatility we have to determine the variance of the jump com-
ponent of equity returns. In Appendix B, we derive an easily computed expression, denoted by
VJA (JA, NA(t);At), that involves a simple integration over the normal density. Hence, total instan-
taneous equity volatility in this (reasonably) general setting is given by:
volt
✓
dEt
Et
◆
=
s
LM2t ⇥  2A,t +
⌫2t  
2
v(t, A.t)
4E2t  
2
A,t
+ 2LMt A,t
⌫t
Et
 v(t, A,t)
2 A,t
⇢t + VJA (JA, NA(t);At)
(27)
There are four terms that contribute to equity volatility. The first term relates to asset volatility
and the second relates to the volatility of asset volatility (as well as the sensitivity of the option
to changes in volatility). The third depends on the correlation between assets innovations and
asset volatility innovations. In practice, this correlation is negative. Thus, the middle two terms in
Equation (27) will have oﬀsetting eﬀects in terms of the contribution of stochastic asset volatility to
equity volatility. Finally, the fourth term relates to the volatility of the jump process for assets. In
later sections and also in the Appendix C, we show that we can ignore all but the first term for the
purposes of volatility modeling in our context because, compared to asset volatility, they contribute
very little to equity volatility. Thus, Equation (26) and (27) reduce to a very simple expression for
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equity returns and instantaneous volatility, and is the basis for Assumption 1:
dEt
Et
⇡ LMt A,tdBA(t)
volt
✓
dEt
Et
◆
⇡ LMt ⇥  A,t (28)
Equation (28) is our key relationship of interest. It states that equity volatility (returns) is a
scaled function of asset volatility (returns), where the function depends on financial leverage, Dt/Et,
as well as asset volatility over the life of the option (and the interest rate). The moniker of the
“leverage multiplier” should be clear now. The functional form for LM(·) depends on a particular
option pricing model, and one of our key contributions is to estimate a generalized LM(·) function
that, in practice, encompasses a number of option pricing models. In order to build further intuition
for the properties of the leverage multiplier, we examine it in three diﬀerent option pricing models:
Merton (1976), Heston (1993), and Bates (1996).
A.2. The Leverage Multiplier Under Various Option Pricing Mod-
els
The purpose of this subsection is twofold. We first aim to show that the approximation in Equation
(28) performs well in a variety of diﬀerent option pricing models. The main mechanism behind this
approximation is as follows: as the time to maturity of the equity option gets larger, the contribution
of the volatility of volatility (and jumps, if small enough in probability) to equity returns/volatility
is minimal. This is primarily because volatility is mean reverting, and thus “long run” volatility is
eﬀectively constant, so that short run changes in volatility matter little for equity returns. In all of
the option pricing models we consider, we assess the accuracy of this approximation in the same way.
We simply parameterize the model and compute the total volatility of equity, given by Equation
(27), within the model. Then, we compare it with the approximation of (28) within the same model.
This comparison is conducted at debt maturities ranging from one month to twenty years. For each
maturity, we choose the debt level such that the leverage is the same across maturities. For example,
suppose we are examining Option Model A. For each maturity, we search for the debt (strike) such
that debt to equity will be some arbitrary level L. For this debt level, we next compute the total
equity volatility and the approximation under Option Model A; then we repeat this process for
each maturity. We opt to keep leverage consistent across maturities since our empirical work will
focus on financial firms whose leverage tends to be high, despite heterogenous debt maturities. The
leverage level we target is L = 15. Why this number for leverage? For the empirical portion of
our investigation, we examine financial firms. Financial firms typically have high levels of leverage
ranging from 10-20, where leverage is measured as the book value of debt divided by the market
value of equity. When possible, we are also careful to keep parameters consistent across all option
pricing models we consider in order to keep the results comparable.
After we establish the validity of the approximation in Equation (28), we explore how the
leverage multiplier behaves in a variety of option pricing settings. As we will show, Equation (28)
53
is indeed a useful approximation, and the leverage multiplier takes on a similar shape across many
diﬀerent models.
A.2.1. The Heston (1993) Model
In order to justify Assumption 1, we study equity dynamics under the popular Heston (1993)
stochastic volatility model. In this setting, asset volatility evolves as follows:
d 2A,t = 
⇥
✓    2A,t
⇤
dt+ ⌘ A,tdBv(t)
The parameter  determines how quickly volatility mean reverts, ✓ determines the asymptotic limit
of volatility and ⌘ tunes the volatility of volatility.32 This specification of asset returns can be
viewed as a special case of Equation (2).
Validating Assumption 1 Our first task is to analyze how equity volatility is aﬀected by this
particular stochastic volatility model. In this model, it is straightforward from Equation (8) that
the total volatility of equity is given by:
volt
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dEt
Et
◆
=
s
LM2t ⇥  2A,t +
⌫2t ⌘
2
4E2t
+ LMt A,t
⌘⌫t
Et
⇢t (dBA(t), dBv(t)) (29)
Let us consider the magnitudes of each of the terms that contribute to equity volatility. The closed
form option pricing formula in this setting was the major contribution of Heston (1993), and the
greeks we are interested in do have closed forms, but we choose to compute them via numerical
derivatives. For the remainder of this subsection, we assume that risk-neutral asset and volatility
processes are specified by the Heston (1993) model, which we parametrize as summarized in Table
6.
Table 6: Heston (1993) Calibration for Risk-Neutral Asset Prices
Parameter Value
 4
✓ 0.152
⌘ 0.15
 A,t 0.15
⇢ -0.5
Notes: This table provides the parameters we use to calibrate the risk-neutral asset return process
under the Heston (1993) model.
32For a more technical description of the properties of this volatility process see Heston (1993) or Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985).
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Setting  = 4 sets the half-life of the volatility process to be approximately 44 days, which is
roughly the half-life of the GARCH processes we typically encounter in practice.33 Setting ✓ = 0.152
means that long-run asset volatility is 15% in annualized terms, which we adopt to keep consistency
with the analysis in Section 2.2.1 (we also initialize current spot volatility to its long-run average).
⌘ = 0.15 makes the volatility of asset volatility to be 15% annually, or equal to the volatility of
assets returns themselves. To the best of our knowledge, this does not contradict known fact.34
Finally, we set the correlation between asset volatility shocks and asset return shocks to be -0.5 in
order to capture the well-known asymmetry in volatility.
Our objective is to show that under the Heston (1993) specification, it is perfectly reasonable
to ignore the terms in Equation (8) that are related to stochastic asset volatility. The argument
for ignoring the stochastic portion of asset volatility in terms of its contribution to equity volatility
hinges on the idea that for longer maturity debt, the volatility of asset volatility contributes very
little to equity volatility. Thus, under the current parameterization of the Heston (1993) model, we
plot the total instantaneous equity volatility against maturity in Equation (29) against maturity.
In addition, we plot instantaneous equity volatility under Assumption 1.35 Figure 13 provides a
visualization of the results.
As should be clear, the assumption underlying Equation (9) is quite reasonable in terms of
capturing total equity volatility. The reason is due entirely to the mean-reversion property of asset
volatility. Because asset volatility mean reverts quickly relative to the life of the debt, the “vega” of
equity is very small. To see this point more forcefully, consider equity returns (with zero drift) if
assets follows the Heston model:
dEt
Et
= LMt A,tdBA(t) +
⌘⌫t
2Et
dBv(t)
How big is each term multiplying the shocks in this model? Staying with the parameters in Table
6, we plot both in Figure 14.
Clearly, the contribution of volatility shocks to equity returns is minimal. This result shouldn’t
be surprising as it is essentially a restatement of the conclusion reached from Figure 13.36
33The half-life of the volatility process is ln(2)/.
34In fact, this may even be too large. As assets are much less volatile than equity, so one might expect
the volatility of asset volatility to be smaller than the volatility of equity volatility as well.
35For each maturity, we search for the debt (strike) such that debt to equity will be some arbitrary level
L. For this debt level, we next compute the total equity volatility and the approximation under the Heston
(1993) model; then we repeat this process for each maturity. We opt to keep leverage consistent across
maturities since our empirical work will focus on financial firms whose leverage tends to be high, despite
heterogenous debt maturities. The leverage level we target is L = 15. Why this number for leverage? For
the empirical portion of our investigation, we examine financial firms. Financial firms typically have high
levels of leverage ranging from 10-20, where leverage is measured as the book value of debt divided by the
market value of equity.
36Hence, we arrive at the previously assumed process for equity returns, even in a stochastic volatility
environment:
dEt
Et
= LMt ⇥  A,tdBA(t)
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Figure 13: Equity Volatility Analysis in Heston (1993) Model
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Notes: The blue line in this figure plots the total (true) volatility of equity if assets follow the Heston (1993)
model. The red line in this figure plots the volatility of equity if it is approximated according to Equation
(9). For each time to maturity, we set At = 1 and choose the level of debt such that financial leverage is
approximately 15. For this analysis, the risk-free rate is set to 0.03.
The Leverage Multiplier in the Heston (1993) Model Now that we have established
that the leverage multiplier is the key determinant of equity dynamics in this stochastic volatility
environment, we turn to a more careful analysis of the actual shape of the leverage multiplier.
Figure 15 plots the leverage multiplier (for debt of maturity ⌧ = 5) against leverage as we did in
the BSM case.
The shape of the leverage multiplier under stochastic volatility is quite similar to the BSM
case. The most obvious diﬀerence is the concavity of the stochastic volatility leverage multiplier.
When moving from low levels of leverage (e.g. 2-3) to intermediate levels of leverage (e.g. 5-7)
the leverage multiplier rises rapidly as compared to the BSM baseline. In addition, the level of
the stochastic volatility leverage multiplier is higher than the BSM counterpart. Because of the
negative correlation between asset returns and asset volatility, the future asset return distribution
has negative skewness. In turn, leverage has strong eﬀects on equity returns and volatility since the
option value of equity is less likely to expire in the money. This intuition is also consistent with
the results of section 2.2.3, where we use Monte Carlo simulation to explore models with stochastic
volatility and non-normal shocks.
This isn’t to say that the volatility of volatility terms do not matter. They matter quite a bit for the level
of equity, but not so much for the returns.
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Figure 14: Equity Return Analysis in Heston (1993) Model
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Notes: The blue line in this figure plots the how much asset return shocks are magnified into equity shocks.
The red line in this figure plots how much volatility shocks are amplified into equity shocks. For each time
to maturity, we set At = 1 and choose the level of debt such that financial leverage is approximately 15. For
this analysis, the risk-free rate is set to zero.
A.2.2. Analysis of the Leverage Multiplier under Merton’s (1976) Jump-Diﬀusion
Model
Another strand of option pricing models in the literature began with the seminal work of Merton
(1976), henceforth MJD. In this formulation, the stock returns follow a standard geometric Brownian
motion, appended with a continuous time Poisson jump process. Again, this case is encompassed by
the specification in Equation (26), but we turn oﬀ the stochastic volatility channel (i.e.  A,t =  A)
and allow only for jumps. In this setting, equity return dynamics from (26) reduce to the following
jump-diﬀusion:
dEt
Et
= LMt AdBA(t) +

EJt   Et
Et
 
dNA(t)
Similarly, the volatility of equity returns reduces to the following:
volt
✓
dEt
Et
◆
=
q
LM2t ⇥  2A + VJA (JA, NA(t);At)
where again the expression for VJA (JA, NA(t);At) is found in Appendix B. The key insight of MJD
model was that, even though dynamic riskless hedging is impossible with discontinuous sample
paths, if individual stock jumps are independent of the prevailing pricing kernel then their presence
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Figure 15: Leverage Multiplier in Heston (1993) Model
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Notes: We plot the leverage multiplier in the Heston (1993) stochastic volatility model against leverage.
The time to maturity is set to five years and the remaining model parameters are given in Table 6. For this
analysis, the risk-free rate is set to r = 0.03.
is an “unpriced” risk and typical hedging arguments can still be applied. Merton (1976) solves for
the closed form option pricing solution, which turns out to be a weighted average of BSM prices,
with the weights determined by the likelihood of a given number of jumps over the life of the debt.37
Our analysis of his solution begins with an assessment of the approximation in Equation (28).
Validating Assumption 1 In order to do so, we first parameterize the MJD model as in Table
7.
37To use the exact Merton (1976) formula in our context, set the mean of the “Merton Jump”, which is
log-normal to µM = log(1 + µJ)   2J/2 in the specification we outline for jumps. The variance is the same.
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Figure 16: Accuracy of Volatility Approximation in Merton (1976) Model
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Table 7: Merton (1976) Calibration for Risk-Neutral Asset Prices
Parameter Value
  0.01
µJ -0.1
 J 0.2
Notes: This table provides the parameters we use to calibrate the asset return process under the Merton
(1976) model.
In this case, the average jump size (µJ) means that when a jump occurs, the asset value falls
by 10%, and has a dispersion ( J) of 20%. Jumps happen at an annualized frequency of  , which
means there are roughly two expected days per year with jumps for assets returns. In addition, it
is well known that the total instantaneous volatility of assets is given by:
volt
✓
dAt
At
◆
=
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 2A +  
h
µ2J +
⇣
e 
2
J   1
⌘
(1 + µJ)
2
i
Thus, in order to keep the analysis comparable to the baseline BSM case, we set  A,t =  A such
that the total annualized asset volatility is 15%. Using only the leverage multiplier to compute
equity volatility (i.e. ignoring volatility added by jumps) is visualized in Figure 16. As is evident
from Figure 16, adding jumps to the asset return process has a very small eﬀect on overall equity
volatility. The variance of the entire jump process, JAdNA(t), is largely dictated by the variance
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Figure 17: Leverage Multiplier in Merton (1976) Jump-Diﬀusion Model
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Note: This figure plots the leverage multiplier in the MJD model. Annualized jump intensity takes on one of
two values   2 {0.01, 0.15}. The time to maturity of the debt also takes on two possible values ⌧ 2 {5, 10}.
The annualized risk-free rate is r = 0.03.
of the Poisson counting process, which is  . Therefore, for reasonable jump arrival intensities,
the variance contribution of jumps to equity volatility will be small in magnitude.38 Now that we
have established that approximating equity volatility by Equation (28), we turn our attention to
understanding the properties of the leverage multiplier in this context.
The Leverage Multiplier in the Merton (1976) Model We study the properties of the
Merton (1976) leverage multiplier by varying the jump intensity  . Again, in order to make these
results comparable to the benchmark BSM analysis, we always set  A such that the annualized
total volatility of assets is 15%. In addition, we vary the time to maturity of the debt. The leverage
multiplier for these diﬀerent cases is displayed in Figure 17.
The economic underpinnings of the leverage multiplier in the MJD case are, unsurprisingly,
quite similar to the BSM case. Holding time to maturity constant, when we decrease the likelihood
of a jump, the leverage multiplier also decreases. Since jumps are assumed to decrease the asset
value, then a lower likelihood of a jump means the equity is more likely to finish in the money and
the eﬀect of leverage on equity volatility is dampened. Holding the likelihood of a jump constant,
when we increase the time to maturity, the leverage multiplier increases. In this case, the diﬀusion
38In the Online Appendix, we repeat this analysis for other parameterizations and find the conclusions to
be robust.
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portion of assets dominates the negative jump component (due to the parameter values we chose).
Adding maturity to the debt therefore means the equity is more likely to expire with value and so
leverage means less for equity volatility. It is likely that for large jump intensities (or large jump
sizes) this eﬀect would reverse, but this type of parameterization seems empirically implausible.
A.2.3. Analysis of the Leverage Multiplier with Stochastic Volatility and Jumps
By now it should be clear that the leverage multiplier takes roughly the same form across diﬀerent
option pricing models; however, for completeness, we conduct one last exploration of the leverage
multiplier shape when assets have both stochastic volatility and are subject to jumps (henceforth
SVJ). The risk-neutral asset return dynamics are thus described as follows:
dAt
At
= [r    µJ ]dt+  A,tdBA(t) + JdNA(t)
d 2A,t = 
⇥
✓    2A,t
⇤
dt+ ⌘ A,tdBv(t)
where the jump process for assets retains its original properties as in Equation (20). The closed
form solution for option prices under these dynamics is also well-known at this point (e.g. Bakshi,
et al. (1997)). We calibrate the model by combining previous parameterizations and repeat them
in Table 8.
Table 8: Parameters for Stochastic Volatility with Jumps Model
Parameter Value
 4
⌘ 0.15
 A,t 0.15
⇢ -0.5
  0.01
µJ -0.1
 J 0.2
Notes: This table provides the parameters we use to calibrate the risk-neutral asset return process under
the SVJ model used by, among others, Bates (1996) and Bakshi et al. (1997).
The long run average for volatility, ✓, set such that the total long run average asset volatility
is 15%. As usual, we begin by checking whether the approximation in Equation (28) holds in this
setting.
Validating Assumption 1 Figure 18 plots the total equity volatility in the SVJ model against
the approximate equity volatility given by (28) for diﬀering maturities and constant leverage.
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Figure 18: Equity Volatility Analysis in SVJ Model
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Notes: The blue line in this figure plots the total (true) volatility of equity if assets follow the SVJ model
(e.g. Bakshi et al. (1997)). The red line in this figure plots the volatility of equity if it is approximated
according to Equation (28). For each time to maturity, we set At = 1 and choose the level of debt such that
financial leverage is approximately 15. For this analysis, the risk-free rate is set to 0.03.
At this point, it should not be so surprising that our approximation holds reasonably well.
Simply put, for reasonable jump arrival intensities and quickly mean-reverting volatility processes,
the main component of equity volatility is asset volatility itself (amplified by the leverage multiplier).
The Leverage Multiplier in the SVJ Model Similarly, Figure 19 plots the leverage mul-
tiplier in the SVJ model. As expected, the leverage multiplier in the SVJ cases is the highest for
high levels of leverage. The intuition from the BSM model still applies: high leverage means the
equity is very likely to expire out of the money for a couple of reasons. First, because volatility and
asset return shocks are negatively correlated, the distribution of future asset returns has negative
skewness, thus making high levels of leverage even more paralyzing in terms of equity finishing with
value. The second reason is due to jumps, which we assume to be negative on average. Together,
both factors contribute to a higher equity volatility amplification mechanism when leverage becomes
too high. Still, the general shape of the leverage multiplier seems consistent across all of the option
pricing models, and we therefore confirm that the results from the main text remain valid.
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Figure 19: Leverage Multiplier in SVJ Model
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Notes: We plot the leverage multiplier in the SVJ model against leverage. The time to maturity is set to
five years and the remaining model parameters are given in Table 8. For this analysis, the risk-free rate is
set to r = 0.03.
B. Appendix: Total Volatility of Equity in Stochastic
Volatility with Jump Environment
We need to compute the variance of the following term:
VJA (JA, NA(t);Et) ⌘ vart
✓
EJt   Et
Et
 
dNA(t)
◆
= vart
✓
EJt
Et
dNA(t)
◆
+ vart (dNA(t))
where we use the independence of NA(t) and JA. To make the dependence of equity value on the
asset jump more explicit, we replace EJt with the call option pricing function, but we suppress all
but the first argument for notional convenience:
EJt = f (At + JA)
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Using the definition of variance and the properties of the Poisson counting process (i.e. variance is
 ), we get the following expression for VJA (JA, NA(t);Et):
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Here, the second line uses the independence of NA(t) and JA, and the third line uses the standard
variance definition for a Poission process.39  (·) and  (·) are given by:
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where hY (y) is the pdf of a normal random variable with mean log [1 + µJ ]  2J/2 and variance  2J .
In practice, VJA (JA, NA(t);At) is easily computed numerically.
39i.e.
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2
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=  +  2
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C. Appendix: Empirical Argument for Ignoring Volatil-
ity Terms
For exposition, we repeat Equation (3):
dEt
Et
=  t · At
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· d fA,t (30)
It is straightforward to work out that equity variance will be as follows:
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where  t = @f
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pricing lingo,  t is the “delta” of the call option on assets, and ⌫t is the “vega” of the call option
on assets.40 In the model where we set the long run volatility of assets to be the unconditional
volatility of the asset GJR process, this analysis is moot as d fA,t = 0. Our task now is to show
that the last two terms are negligible for the purposes of modeling equity volatility, when we use
the GJR forecast for long run asset volatility.
C.1. Magnitude of Volatility Terms
In the language of the Structural GARCH model we can simply substitute LMt into Equation (31)
where it is appropriate:
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(32)
In order to investigate the magnitude of the terms we ignore (i.e. any term containing ⌫t), we need
a functional form for the sensitivity of the equity value to changes in long run asset volatility. Since
we are only interested in magnitudes, we will use the Black-Scholes vega. It is unlikely that the
Black-Scholes vega is incorrect by an order of magnitude, so for this exercise it will be suﬃcient.
The next thing we need in order to quantitatively evaluate Equation (32) are time-series for LMt,
dAt/At, and d fA,t. To be precise, if we extended the model to include changes in volatility we would
40To be precise, these are the delta and vega of the option where debt has been normalized to 1.
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undoubtedly obtain diﬀerent estimates for these three quantities. Again, since our goal is to assess
relative magnitudes, we will simply use the values delivered by our Structural GARCH model for
LMt, dAt/At, and d fA,t. Formally, we define d 
f
A,t as:
d fA,t =
q
hfA,t+1/⌧  
q
hfA,t/⌧
where hfA,t+1 is the forecast of total volatility over the life of the option. Finally, we set the volatility
of volatility to be constant and the correlation between asset returns and volatility to be constant.
Under this assumption, we estimate these quantities using their in-sample moments.
C.1.1. Case Study: JPM
As an example, we study JPM. Table 9 contains the in-sample moments of the estimated stochastic
volatility process.
Table 9: Moments for Volatility Forecast Innovations
Variable Valuer
vart
⇣
d fA,t
⌘
4.9737e-04
⇢t
⇣
dAt
At
, d fA,t
⌘
-0.427
Notes: This table contains the in-sample moments of the asset volatility and asset return process implied by
the Structural GARCH applied to JPM.
Unsurprisingly, there is a strong negative correlation between the innovation to the long run asset
volatility forecast and asset returns. In addition, the extremely small volatility of volatility provides
us our first piece of supporting evidence in favor of ignoring the additional vega terms. Next, we
plot each of the three terms from Equation (32). Figure 20 confirms our assumption that including
d fA,t has a small eﬀect on our main volatility specification. Moreover, it is clear from Equation
(32) that any additional volatility of volatility that contributes to equity volatility will be oﬀset by
the negative correlation between asset volatility and asset returns. On average, the variance arising
from our standard leverage multiplier term is approximately 12 times larger (in absolute value) than
the sum the additional terms due to vega. Furthermore, the leverage multiplier term dominates
the vega terms in times of high volatility, which tend to be our main areas of interest. Thus, we
conclude that we can ignore the additional vega terms within the context of our Structural GARCH
model.
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Figure 20: Decomposition of Equity Variance for JPM
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Notes: The figure above plots each time series for each of the three terms in Equation (32). The blue line
represents the first term, containing LM2t . The red line is the second term, and contains only vart(d 
f
A,t).
Finally, the green line is last covariance term.
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D. Data Appendix
D.1. List of Firms Analyzed
Table 10: List of Firms Analyzed
ABK CBSS HRB SAF
ACAS CFC HUM SEIC
AET CI JNS SLM
AFL CIT JPM SNV
AGE CMA KEY SOV
AIG CNA LEH STI
ALL COF LNC STT
AMP CVH MBI TMK
AMTD ETFC MER TROW
AON ETN MET TRV
AXP EV MI UB
BAC FITB MMC UNM
BBT FNF MS USB
BEN FNM MTB WB
BK FRE NCC WFC
BLK GNW PBCT WM
BOT GS PFG WRB
BSC HBAN PGR ZION
C HCBK PNC
CB HIG PRU
CBH HNT RF
D.2. Outlier Cases
Compared to the estimation done on 11/11/2013, there were a few firms that had name changes.
To avoid issues with data quality, we throw these out. This leaves us with a total of 82 firms. There
are 10 firms that hit the lower bound: SCHW:US, JNS:US, LM:US, BK:US, BLK:US, NTRS:US,
CME:US, CINF:US, TMK:US, UNH:US.
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